28.	28 February 2019	Respondents' attorneys address an email to Judge Tlhapi's secretary confirming 8 March 2019 as the date for the hearing.
29.	4 March 2019	Applicants' attorneys address an email to Judge Tlhapi's secretary advising her of their counsels' lack of availability on 8 March 2019.
30.	4 March 2019	Respondents' attorneys address an email to Judge Tlhapi's secretary requesting that two alternate dates be provided for the hearing to take place within the next 3 weeks so as to avoid any further delays in the matter.
31.	15 March 2019	Nothing is heard from Judge Tlhapi's secretary, and the respondents' attorneys address a further email to her following up on their email of 4 March 2019.
32.	26 March 2019	Nothing is heard from Judge Tlhapi's secretary, and the respondents' attorneys address a further email to her following up on their emails of 4 and 15 March 2019.
33.	8 April 2019	An email is received from Judge Tlhapi's secretary proposing 26 April or 3 May 2019 for the hearing of the application for leave to appeal.
34.	8 April 2019	Respondents' attorneys address a response to Judge Tlhapi's secretary advising that their counsel are unavailable on the proposed dates and suggested alternate dates instead.
35.	24 April 2019	Respondents' attorneys address an email to Judge Tlhapi's secretary following up on their email of 8 April 2019.
36.	24 April 2019	The parties receive an email from Judge Tlhapi's secretary requesting alternate dates on which both parties' counsel are available.

37.	24 April 2019	Respondents' attorneys address an email to the applicants' attorneys advising them of 5 alternate dates that respondents' counsel are available for the hearing.
38.	2 & 5 May 2019	Exchange of communications between the parties' attorneys as to dates that all parties' counsel were available.
39.	13 May 2019	Nothing is heard from the applicants' attorneys. Respondents' attorneys address an email to applicants' attorneys to follow up on their counsels' availability.
40.	15 May 2019	Further email addressed by respondents' attorneys to applicants' attorneys to follow up on email of 13 May 2019.
41.	18 May 2019	Respondents' attorneys address an email to Judge Tlhapi's secretary requesting the learned Judge's intervention in proposing a date for the hearing of the application for leave to appeal, given the applicants' failure to respond.
42.	22 May 2019	Respondents' attorneys address a further email to Judge Tlhapi's secretary to follow up on their email of 18 May 2019.
43.	28 May 2019	Respondents' attorneys address a further email to Judge Tlhapi's secretary to follow up on their emails of 18 and 22 May 2019.
44.	31 May 2019	Respondents' attorneys receive a response from Judge Tlhapi's secretary apologising for the delay in responding, advising that she and Judge Thlapi had both been sick and that they would revert as soon as possible.
45.	3 June 2019	Respondents' attorneys address an email to Judge Tlhapi's secretary to follow up on her email of 31 May 2019.
46.	5 June 2019	Respondents deliver a notice of intention to amend their particulars of claim.

47.	7 June 2019	We addressed an email to Judge Tlhapi's secretary to follow up on our emails dated 31 May and 3 June 2019.
48.	11 June 2019	An exchange of emails with Judge Tlhapi's secretary regarding the significant delays in a date being allocated for the hearing of the application for leave to appeal.
49.	18 June 2019	Respondents' attorneys address a letter to the DJP requesting his intervention in allocating a date for the hearing of the application for leave to appeal.
50.	25 June 2019	Respondents' attorneys receive an email from Judge Tlhapi's secretary proposing 29 July 2019 for the hearing of the application for leave to appeal.
51.	28 June 2019	Respondents' attorneys address a response to Judge Tlhapi's secretary confirming their counsels' availability.
52.	2 July 2019	No opposition to the proposed amendments having been received, respondents deliver their amendment.
53.	23 July 2019	Applicants decline to deliver any consequential amendment to their plea following the receipt of the amended particulars of claim within the time allowed.
54.	24 July 2019	Judge Tlhapi's secretary confirms that the application for leave to appeal will proceed on 29 July 2019.
55.	29 July 2019	The application for leave to appeal is postponed due to strikes around the court.
56.	8 August 2019	Applicants' application for leave to appeal is heard before Judge Tlhapi, some 9 months after the reasons for judgment were handed down.

57.	12 August 2019	Respondents' attorneys address an email to Judge Tlhapi's secretary to follow up on the judgment in the application for leave to appeal.
58.	15 August 2019	Respondents' attorneys address a further email to Judge Tlhapi's secretary to follow up on email of 12 August 2019.
59.	20 August 2019	Respondents' attorneys address a further email to Judge Tlhapi's secretary to follow up on their emails of 12 and 15 August 2019.
60.	22 August 2019	A response is received from Judge Tlhapi's secretary advising that the judgment in the application for leave to appeal will be handed down on 26 August 2019.
61.	26 August 2019	Judge Tlhapi hands down the judgment in the application for leave to appeal, granting the applicants leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal ('the SCA').
62.	20 September 2019	The respondents deliver their discovery affidavit and copies of documents in the action.
63.	26 September 2019	The applicants deliver their notice of appeal to the SCA.
64.	10 October 2019	Respondents' attorneys address an email to the applicants' attorneys requesting confirmation as to whether they yet intend delivering a consequential amendment to the applicants' plea following on the Plaintiffs' amendment to the particulars of claim on 2 July 2019.
65.	11 October 2019	Respondents' attorneys receive a response from the applicants' attorneys to say that they were still taking instructions on the amendment.
66.	18 January 2020	The applicants deliver the record to the SCA for the appeal.

67.	24 January 2020	Respondents deliver a request for further particulars.
68.	21 February 2020	Respondents' attorneys address an email to the applicants' attorneys following up on their failure to respond to the request for further particulars.
69.	3 March 2020	Applicants deliver their response to the request for further particulars some 4 weeks late.
70.	17 March 2020	Applicants deliver a condonation application for the late filing of their heads of argument for the SCA appeal.
71.	26 March 2020	***NATIONWIDE LOCKDOWN DUE TO COVID-19***
72.	14 April 2020	Respondents deliver their heads of argument in the SCA appeal.
73.	6 August 2020	Respondents deliver a Rule 37(2)(a) notice requesting a pre-trial conference.
74.	27 August 2020	Respondents attorneys address an email to the applicants' attorneys to follow up on the request for a pre-trail conference, which had gone unanswered.
75.	30 September 2020	Notice of set down received in the SCA appeal for 16 November 2020.
76.	16 November 2020	Applicants' appeal heard before the SCA and struck from the roll, with reasons to follow.
77.	20 November 2020	Respondents deliver a further notice of amendment to their particulars of claim together with a further notice in terms of Rule 37 requesting a pre-trial conference.

78.	7 December 2020	Applicants file no objection to the proposed amendments. Respondents deliver their amendment, with agenda for the pre-trial conference in terms of Rule 37(4).
79.	8 December 2020	Respondents' attorneys address a further email to the applicants' attorneys again providing them with the agenda in terms of Rule 37(4) and requesting that a pre-trial conference be held as requested some 4 months previously on 6 August 2020 (see para 73 above).
80.	13 January 2021	The SCA hands down its reasons for judgment.
81.	13 January 2021	Nothing having been heard from the applicants as regards the pre-trial conference, respondents' attorneys address a letter to the Registrar of the High Court of South Africa, Gauteng Division, Pretoria requesting intervention in terms of Rule 37(3)(b) for the allocation of a date for the pre-trial conference to take place.
82.	29 January 2021	Applicants' attorneys contact respondents' attorneys suggesting that the pre-trial take place the following week. The parties agree on a date for the pre-trial conference, 3 February 2021.
83.	3 February 2021	The pre-trial conference is held. Applicants deliver no agenda in terms of rule 37(4). Applicants require a further two week period within which to respond to certain aspects of the respondents' agenda, and agree to revert by 17 February 2021. Respondents agree to revert to the applicants by the same date in regard to certain admissions requested by the applicants at the pre-trial conference.
84.	5 February 2021	Minute of the pre-trial conference signed on behalf of all parties

"AA6"

UNITED DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT

Office of the President

Tel: 012-321-0010
Fax: 087-941-9052
PO Box 76250, Arcadia, 0007

bhokomosa@udm.org.za

www.udm.org.za
@UDmSouthAfrica
udm.rsa

26 June 2018

Mr CM Ramaphosa
President of the Republic of South Africa
Union Buildings
Private Bag X 1000
Pretoria
0001

Dear Mr President

UNMASKING HARITH AND LEBASHE'S ALLEGED FLEECING OF THE PUBLIC INVESTMENT CORPORATION

1. I refer to the United Democratic Movement's (UDM) previous two letters addressed to you and dated 31 May and 8 June 2018 regarding possible corruption at the Public Investment Corporation (PIC) that potentially could make the Gupta Family's alleged capture of state look like chump change.

2. As forewarned in those letters the iceberg of corruption is rising day-by-day as more is revealed around the alleged corruption aimed at fleecing the PIC of billions of rands. We have received another tip-off from a reliable source and, with a little scratch-work of our own, we herewith give you the information the UDM has uncovered of individuals and companies who might be knee-deep in the more than a decade's worth of pillaging the PIC.

3. **The crux of the matter is that there is an allegation that Dr Dan Matjila, the current PIC CEO is - pardon the colloquialism - in bed with the Mr Tshepo Mahloele, Mr Jabu Moleketi and Mr Warren Wheatly.**

It is alleged that Dr Matjila uses his approval limit, of up to R2 billion, to avoid having to get the board to approve deals. It is alleged that the PIC has thusly funded these gentlemen in the Capitec, EOH and Momentum MMI deals in one year!

3.1. The companies/firms/organisations that feature in this troublesome tale is:

- 4 Africa Exchange,
- Aluwani Capital and Aluwani Capital Partners,
- Capitec,
- Coral Lagoon,
- EOH,
- Harith General Partners and Harith Fund Management Company,
- Lebashe Investment Group,
- Momentum MMI,
- PetraTouch,
- RainFin,
- Regiment Capital and
- Tactical Software Systems (TSS).

Mr President, these companies and individuals all have link/s - past and present, directly or indirectly - with the PIC. It makes for uncomfortable reading when one considers the possibility of a very complicated and opaque scheme that will put at risk the Government Employees Pension Fund.

4. We here below try to unravel a quite complex web, which is, as far as we are aware correct:

4.1. Mr Tshepo Mahloele had managed the PIC's Corporate Finance and Isibaya Fund Division. He also is one of the originators of Harith General Partners and now serves as its chief executive officer (CEO) and is also a director of Harith Fund Management Company. The PIC apparently owns 30% of Harith General Partners.

Mr Mahloele had managed the Pan-African Infrastructure Development Fund (PAIDF) during his tenure at the PIC, which was set-up by him and Mr Brian Molefe during the latter's time at the PIC. As far as we understand, PAIDF is now managed by Harith General Partners and Harith Fund Management Company.

Mr Mahloele is also a director of the online lending firm RainFin with a reported R100 million enterprise value. He has/had links with black economic empowerment (BEE) consortium, PetraTouch. He is a director of the 4 Africa Exchange wherein Lebashe Investment Group reportedly has an "unspecified stake". Mr Mahloele had also been a past non-executive Director of Capitec.

4.2. Former deputy finance minister, Mr Jabu Moleketi is Harith General Partners' board chairperson and serves as a director at RainFin. During his tenure as deputy minister of finance, he served as the board chairperson of the PIC. Mr Moleketi is the chairperson of Aluwani Capital Partners and a non-executive director for Aluwani Capital. He also is an independent non-executive director of MMI Holdings, which has links with Aluwani Capital, in which Lebashe is invested.

4.3. Mr Warren Wheatly is reportedly the founding principal and executive director of Lebashe and is a director at RainFin. He apparently started TSS Capital and serves/ed as its director, chief investment officer and CEO. Lebashe apparently owns TSS Capital. Mr Wheatly also serves/ed on the boards of PetraTouch and Aluwani Capital Partners.

4.4. The BEE consortium PetraTouch, led by Mr Mahloele, has become Capitec's largest empowerment shareholder, whilst RainFin loaned money to PetraTouch.

4.5. Coral Lagoon which was started with the help of the Industrial Development Corporation was the BEE partner of Capitec. Regiments Capital (which has links to the African National Congress) owns/owned 18% of Coral Lagoon.

4.6. Lebashe apparently owns 5.3% Capitec shares.

4.7 Listed business technology services group EOH embarked on a R3.2 billion a BEE deal with Lebashe.

Of all these companies, **Lebashe Investment Group** is the opaquest, with absolutely no internet presence, aside from online articles about illustrious investment and BEE deals, with one source claiming that the group manages assets worth R8.5 billion. It is also reported that Lebashe owns 75% of RainFin. RainFin's blog does indeed mention that Lebashe is "led" by Messrs Moleketi, Wheatly and Mahloele.

5. The above reads like a spy novel with incomprehensible twists and turns, with only clues as to the real nature of the relationship between these companies and Messrs Mahloele, Moleketi and Wheatly. From the above information, one can however see that there is a complicated system at work to apparently hide that the PIC is being fleeced at an astonishing pace.

6. There are several pertinent points to be made and questions to be answered Mr President, they are, but not limited to:

   6.1. How was Harith formed using PIC monies and for what reason was it allowed (or predestined) that Mr Mahloele should automatically move from the PIC (Corporate Finance and Isibaya Fund) to Harith CEO? It does seem like a cushy arrangement.

   6.2. At face value, there seems to be a concerted effort to hide, layer within layer, the relationships between the role-players and their past and present roles to the PIC.

   6.3. Harith and Lebashe seems to be the same company dressed up differently, with the self-same individuals at their helms, which seemingly serves as a twin portal to access PIC funds.

   6.4. Of interest is the nature of the relationship between Lebashe and the PIC. Lebashe seems to be an unknown company that has no corporate identity, but it seemingly has access to PIC funds via the current CEO, Dr Maljila.

   6.5. There is something *seriously* wrong where Lebashe is concerned. From our research, little is known about Lebashe and it must be established for whom do they managed R8.5 billion worth of assets.

   6.6. Are companies, with seemingly legitimate business, not front companies for a select group of super rich people to syphon money from the PIC?

   6.7. Did/does the PIC corporate machinery do due diligence when approving loans; in general, but in particular where the above-mentioned companies are/were concerned and are these loans serviced?

   6.8. Is there any truth in that these seemingly "100% black-owned companies" (where at least one or more of the gentlemen are involved) are "window-dressing" for "white companies" to access funds from the PIC by playing the BEE card?

7. Mr President, instead of being a giant machinery that creates wealthopportunities for South Africans, it is clear that individuals such as Messrs Mahloele, Matjila, Moleketi and Wheatly are at least double or triple dipping in the PIC's funds. In fact, one shudders to consider how many conduits they have at their disposal to sap PIC funds.

8. If there is a case to be made that Messrs Mahloele, Matjila, Moleketi and Wheatly are part of an elite, are there other individuals pulling the self-same tricks to make themselves extraordinarily rich at the expense of government employees.

9. Finally Sir, what will happen if these disguised BEE deals that have been struck using the PIC's money fold? Just as in the case of VBS Mutual Bank, the money will evaporate into thin air and leave the government employees high and dry.

   Stressing this point, I remind you of the section in the addendum of my 31 May 2018 letter, that speaks to Steinhoff. Therein we talk about and entity led by Mr Jayendra Naidoo called Lancaster01, where R9.3 billion went down the drain in the name of BEE.

   For our government employees, this wending and winding of business is not at the forefront of their thoughts, they are not investment capitalists who are in it to get rich. They are good and honest working South Africans who will lose their entire futures should any of these deals go bust.

10. After having explained in this letter
    - what we believe to be egregious abuses of the PIC,
    - the points we made herein, the
    - questions we asked, and
    - considering the nauseating list of examples given in our 31 May letter,

    it is clear that, to coin a term, "PIC-gate" dwarfs the alleged state capture of the Gupta-family.

11. The UDM again and with urgency presses upon you the need that the terms of reference of the State Capture Inquiry should be broadened to investigate PIC-gate and that this should happen soon, before the paper trail is shredded in dark back rooms.

    We also reiterate our call that the Deputy Chief Justice Zondo's team includes forensic specialists to get to the bottom of this grand scheme of state capture.

In addition, we suggest that you issue a proclamation which would have the Financial Intelligence Services assist in the inquiry.

This will enable the inquiry to ascertain which companies, that have been successful in accessing PIC-funding, are legitimate BEE entities and which are fronts. It could also determine where the monies are invested, who owns those companies and/or if any political party benefits from its association with such companies.

Kindly advise

Mr Bantu Holomisa, MP
UDM President

"AA7"

Bantu Holomisa
@BantuHolomisa

PIC allegations: black-owned firm Lebashe warns Holomisa will sue Sue urselves for confirming allegations. LAUGHING

PIC allegations: black-owned firm Lebashe warns Holomisa...
BUSINESS LIVE / 27 JUNE 2018 - 05:06 / GIULIETTA TALEVI
Black-owned investment group Lebashe plans to sue United Democratic Movement (UDM) leader Bantu Holomisa...

4:26 PM - 28 Jun 2018

13 Retweets **17** Likes

9 13 17

"AA8"

SAfm news
@SAfmnews

@UDmRevolution leader @BantuHolomisa says he will not back down and retract his statements made in his letter to Pres @CyrilRamaphosa regarding dodgy deals between the Public Investment Corporation #PIC and two investment companies, Lebashe and Harith General Partners. #SABCNews

7:27 AM - 30 Jun 2018

7 Retweets **10** Likes

7 10

"AA9"

Bantu Holomisa
@BantuHolomisa

The proximity of Harith & Lebashe directors to PIC is making an interesting read. We are spot on. They seem to be trusted Indunas .The sooner President Ramaphosa agrees to investigate his fellow comrades like Jabu Moleketi & other hyenas , the better.
fin24.com/Companies/Fina...

9:50 AM - 1 Jul 2018

83 Retweets **124** Likes

28 83 124

"AA10"

The order of events – the Harith companies

1. The year 2003

   1.1. Mahloele was employed as the Head of Corporate Finance and the Isibaya Fund at the PIC.

   1.2. Mahloele remained in that position until March 2006.

2. The Year 2004

   2.1. Moleketi was appointed Deputy Minister of Finance by President Mbeki. In that capacity Moleketi became the ex officio Chairman of the PIC and a non-executive director thereof. (He remained in that position until September 2008.)

   2.2. Towards the end of 2004 President Mbeki articulated a vision of the private sector playing a key role, together with government, by investing in the future development of infrastructure on the African continent.

   2.3. This became one of the guiding principles and ideals which Moleketi was tasked with implementing.

3. The Year 2006

   3.1. In March, Mahloele resigned from his employment with the PIC.

   3.2. In April, and in line with the vision of President Mbeki, Mahloele was tasked by the PIC to set up the Pan African Infrastructure Development Fund ("the PAIDF"). In order to attract private sector investment in the PAIDF, the fund had to be, and had to be seen to

be, entirely independent of government control. The PIC executive committee, following internal procedures, loaned to the PAIDF Facilitation Trust (not to the second applicant, as erroneously stated in paragraph 16.11 of the founding affidavit, an error for which I apologise) seed capital in the amount of R25 million, which was also approved by National Treasury.

3.3. The purpose of this investment was to investigate the feasibility of the establishment of the fund and, if proceeded with, to attract and pursue private sector funding. Those funds were provided by way of an arm's length loan which was repayable in full, plus interest, to the PIC.

3.4. Moleketi, as chair of the PIC, did not sit on the PIC executive committee and was therefore not party to the decision to loan R25 million.

3.5. The seed capital loan, plus accrued interest was repaid within two years of receipt thereof.

3.6. The PIC, in addition to enjoying a return of capital plus interest, received dividends in excess of R100 million by virtue of its shareholding in Harith FM.

4. The Year 2007

4.1. From the time of the establishment of the PAIDF in 2006 until approximately July 2007, potential investors were sought and, in some cases, secured.

4.2. In January 2007, Harith FM was set up by Mahloele to manage the PAIDF.

4.3. The shareholders of Harith FM were:

4.3.1. the PIC as to 46%;

4.3.2. Old Mutual Life Assurance Limited as to 12%;

4.3.3. ABSA Trading and Investment Solutions (Pty) Ltd as to 12%;

4.3.4. the Harith Share Incentive Scheme Trust ("the HSIST") as to 30%. This trust permitted the employees of Harith FM to participate indirectly in an equity share of the company thereby incentivising them over and above their salary entitlements. It is a precondition in the industry that the highly skilled employees, who are necessary to administer and manage the funds under their control, be offered such an equity share. These employees, however, receive no equity benefit unless and until the clients for whom they are managing and investing funds have been fully paid out.

4.4. By virtue of his chairmanship of the PIC, Moleketi, together with two other non-executive directors from the PIC, were appointed as non-executive directors of Harith FM. Moleketi received no remuneration therefor while he remained in public office. Mahloele became a director of Harith FM. Several highly skilled employees, necessary for the overall expertise of the fund were head hunted by Mahloele, in his capacity as CEO of Harith FM. These employees were sourced from the financial services industry at large. It was these employees who were the beneficiaries of the HSIST.

4.5. The purpose and objective of Harith FM was solely the management of the PAIDF. As such it was precluded from establishing further funds.

4.6. By August 2007, the sum of $630 million had been raised and the PAIDF was then closed. The investors were:

4.6.1. the Government Employees Pension Fund ("the GEPF") as to $250 million;

4.6.2. ABSA Bank Limited as to $125 million;

4.6.3. the Development Bank of South Africa ("the DBSA") as to $100 million;

4.6.4. the African Development Bank (Abidjan) ("AfDB") and Old Mutual Life Assurance, each as to $50 million;

4.6.5. StanLib as to $30 million;

4.6.6. SSNIT, a Ghanaian pension fund, and Momentum Metropolitan Holdings, each as to $10 million;

4.6.7. the Eskom Pension and Provident Fund as to $5 million.

4.7. The investors were not required immediately to pay over the full amount of their commitments. As was practice in the industry, they undertook to make the funds available as and when required by the fund manager, who drew down the funds in line with the demands of the relevant investments. Funds are not held idle in bank accounts to be drawn on, as and when the fund manager pleases.

4.8. The investors actively participated in the choice and nature of all investments through an Invesment Committee, which allows them the ability to "see through" the fund structure. This meant that the investors were able at any time to scrutinize all gains and losses made or incurred during the course of the investment cycles and of all amounts utilised for purposes thereof. As a result, there was a high degree of accountability and transparency which the fund manager accepted *vis-a-vis* the investors. These principles are recognised standard practice in the fund management industry.

4.9. The return on investments made by the PAIDF was almost double the amount originally invested. As of March 2018 the GEPF's initial investment of R4.5 billion (forming part of the $630 million), was independently valued at R8.2 billion.

5. The Years 2007 – 2011

5.1. The $630 million referred to above was invested in the following projects, amongst others:

5.1.1. an undersea cable running from Nigeria to Portugal, called "Main One" ;

5.1.2. two airports in Tunisia (Enfidha and Monastir);

5.1.3. a wind farm power station in Kenya;

5.1.4. Lanseria Airport;

5.1.5. the Kelvin Power Station; and

5.1.6. Dark Fibre Africa, a broadband provider.

5.2. In September 2008, Moleketi resigned as Deputy Minister of Finance and accordingly as the ex officio chairman of the PIC. However, at the request of the shareholders of Harith FM, Moleketi remained the chairman thereof.

5.3. Given the limitations of Harith FM, it was anticipated that it would be necessary later to make use of a vehicle under which further funds, in addition to the PAIDF, could be established and managed, in contrast to the single fund mandate of Harith FM. For this reason, Harith GP was established which, as its name suggests, was mandated to manage several funds under a single umbrella.

a/w

6. The Year 2012

6.1. Harith FM determined to subcontract its management agreement with the PAIDF to Harith GP. This meant that all the active staff and skilled employees of Harith FM were transferred to Harith GP.

6.2. The transition required the approval of Harith FM's shareholders together with ten investors in the PAIDF, which was duly granted.

7. The Year 2013

7.1. Harith GP became active in October 2013.

7.2. The shareholders of Harith GP are:

7.2.1. Harith Holdings (Pty) Ltd as to 70%;

7.2.2. the PIC as to 30%.

7.3. Harith Holdings (Pty) Ltd in turn is held as to 100% by the HSIST in which its skilled employees participate in the manner described above regarding Harith FM.

7.4. The identity of the directors of Harith GP, historically, appears from paginated pages 278 - 280 of annexure "AA6" to the answering affidavit. The current directors of Harith GP are:

7.4.1. Mahloele;

7.4.2. Moleketi;

7.4.3. Thomas Tertius Steyn;

7.4.4. Michael John Olivier;

7.4.5. Alwyn Jacobus Wessels;

7.4.6. Lungile Constance Cele;

7.4.7. Mabotha Arthur Moloto;

7.4.8. Dolika Enelessi Banda;

7.4.9. Sebenzile Patrick Mngconkola;

7.4.10. Roshan Morar;

7.4.11. Johan Dawid Nieman.

7.5. A second fund (known as 'PAIDF 2') in the amount of $435 million was then raised by Harith GP with the following investors:

7.5.1. the GEPF as to $350 million;

7.5.2. DTD, a consortium of high net worth individuals as to $35 million;

7.5.3. AfDB as to $25 million;

7.5.4. DBSA as to $15 million;

7.5.5. Botswana Public Officers' Pension Fund as to $10 million.

7.6. PAIDF 2 was finally closed to further funding contributions in June 2016 and the funds invested in similar projects as the inaugural fund.

7.7. As at March 2018, the GEPF's initial investment of R1.2 billion (forming part of the $435 million) was independently valued at R1.7 billion.

7.8. The same principles of scrutiny, accountability and transparency as set out above apply in regard to PAIDF 2.

The order of events – Lebashe

8. The Year 2011

8.1. At this stage, I was employed by ABSA Capital (Pty) Ltd, advising clients on their investments. One of my clients was Mahloele.

8.2. Mahloele, through a separate investment vehicle, was one of the shareholders in a company called Coral Lagoon (Pty) Ltd which in turn held 10 million Capitec shares that it had purchased for R30 per share. This purchase was funded by the Industrial Development Corporation ("the IDC") in terms of which the IDC was entitled to a profit share in Coral Lagoon.

8.3. By virtue of its shareholding in Capitec, Coral Lagoon was entitled to nominate a director to the Capitec board. It nominated Mahloele who sat as a non-executive director from April 2007 to January 2011 when Coral Lagoon appointed another director in his place.

9. The Year 2012

9.1. Coral Lagoon wished to pay off its debt to the IDC. It approached the PIC with an offer that the PIC purchase some of its Capitec shares. In February 2012, the PIC purchased 5.3 million of these shares for R156 per share. It was a provision of the sale agreement that the PIC would obtain the shares only for the purpose of selling them in turn to another suitably qualified BEE purchaser.

9.2. This sale was disclosed to the public through the Johannesburg Stock Exchange News Service ("JSE SENS") and published widely in the media on 29 February 2012. These announcements are still

available today on the Capitec and JSE websites as well as through a basic internet search.

10. The Year 2013

I left ABSA capital and set up an independent advisory company called TSS Capital (Pty) Ltd ("TSS").

11. The Year 2015

11.1. Lebashe was established, initially under the name Petra Touch (Pty) Ltd.

11.2. The history and identity of Lebashe's directors and shareholders are set out on paginated page 226 of annexure "AA6" to the answering affidavit. As appears therefrom, there are nine shareholders and three current directors, namely Mahloele, Moleketi and me.

11.3. Lebashe presented a fully funded proposal for Lebashe to purchase the 5.3 million Capitec shares. The PIC accepted the proposal at a price of R370 per share, subject to various conditions precedent.

11.4. By the time those conditions were met, the share price had risen to R472 per share. The PIC thus received R472 per share, showing a profit of over R316 per share, which equated to a total profit of R1.7 billion. This sale was disclosed to the public through a SENS announcement and published widely in media on 12 May 2015. These announcements are still available today on the Capitec and JSE websites as well as through a basic internet search.

11.5. The cost of the shares, amounting to R2.4 billion, was funded by Investec Corporate Bank in the amount of R1.7 billion and by the PIC in the amount of R720 million.

11.6. The loan that Lebashe received from the PIC was disclosed in the PIC's widely published Isibaya Investment schedule, which identified all the PIC's investments as at 31 March 2016.

12. The Year 2016

12.1. As to the remaining Capitec shares held by Coral Lagoon, Lebashe purchased 3.1 million of those for R1.4 billion. Lebashe approached a consortium of funders made up largely of the PIC, Peregrine Securities and Sanlam for funding. The PIC loaned Lebashe R1.1 billion. The interest on this loan, at a market related rate, is currently being repaid, the repayment of the capital not yet being due. It is estimated that the PIC will profit from this transaction in the sum of R700 million.

12.2. This sale was disclosed to the public through a SENS announcement and published in the media on 7 July 2017. These announcements are still available today on the Capitec and JSE websites as well as through a basic internet search.

12.3. The loan that Lebashe received from the PIC was disclosed in its widely published Isibaya Investment schedule, which identified all the PIC's investments as at 31 March 2017.

13. 2018

13.1. Lebashe repaid the loan that it received from the PIC of R720 million, plus accrued interest in the first quarter of 2018. The PIC therefore earned interest in excess of R 200 million over 2.5 years.

13.2. The PIC profited on the acquisition of the 5.3 million shares. It received R1.7 billion in capital profits and in excess of R200 million in accrued interest.

14. Lebashe did not seek the involvement of the PIC in any other funding arrangements with Aluwani, Rain Fin, EOH and the other entities referred to in the letter.

15. It is important to note that the PIC publicly discloses all its investments. The names of the borrowers, and the full nature of each transaction, are fully identified and disclosed to the public. In addition the PIC reports on its activities to Parliament's Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA) and to the Public Finance Committee. All members of Parliament, including Holomisa, are able to access this information.

16. It is public knowledge that the value of the assets of the PIC is some R2 trillion. The PIC has approximately 119 private companies in which it invests a total of some R147 billion. Of that, as appears above, Lebashe has been funded to the extent of R1.4 billion, which constitutes 0.95% of the PIC's investment in the 119 private companies. This excludes the PIC's investment in listed companies, which accounts for approximately 12% of the listed capital on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange.